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Abstract
Recent studies have shown that deep neural networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks,
including evasion and backdoor attacks. On the defense side, there have been intensive interests in provable
robustness against evasion attacks, while lack of robustness guarantees against backdoor attacks.
In this paper, we focus on certifying the model robustness against general threat models. We first provide
a unified framework via randomized smoothing and show it can be instantiated to certify robustness against
both evasion and backdoor attacks. We then propose the first robust training process, RAB, to certify model
robustness against backdoor attacks. We theoretically prove the robustness bound for machine learning
models based on this training process, prove that the bound is tight, and derive robustness conditions
for Gaussian and Uniform smoothing distributions. Moreover, we evaluate the certified robustness of a
family of smoothed models which are trained in a differentially private fashion, and show that they achieve
better certified robustness bounds. In addition, we theoretically show that it is possible to train the robust
smoothed models efficiently for simple models such as K-nearest neighbor classifiers, and we propose an
exact smooth-training algorithm which eliminates the need to sample from a noise distribution.
Empirically, we conduct comprehensive experiments for different machine learning models such as DNNs,
differentially private DNNs, and K-NN models on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets, and provide the
first benchmark for certified robustness against backdoor attacks. We evaluate K-NN models on a spambase
tabular dataset to demonstrate advantages of the proposed exact algorithm. The theoretic analysis and
the comprehensive benchmark on diverse ML models and datasets shed lights on further robust learning
strategies against general adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Building machine learning algorithms that are robust to adversarial attacks has been an emerging topic over
the last decade. There are mainly two different types of adversarial attacks: (1) evasion attacks, in which the
attackers manipulate the test examples against a trained machine learning model, and (2) data poisoning
attacks, in which the attackers are allowed to perturb the training set. Both types of attacks have attracted
intensive interests from academia as well as industry [16, 45, 24, 47].
Several solutions to these threats have been proposed [5, 46, 28, 49]. For instance, adversarial training has
been proposed to retrain the ML models with generated adversarial examples [29]; quantization has been
applied to either inputs or neural network weights to defend against potential adversarial instances [46].
However, recent studies have shown that these defenses are not resilient against intelligent adversaries
responding dynamically to the deployed defenses [5].
As a result, one recent, exciting line of research aims to develop provably robust algorithms against evasion
attacks. To provide provable robustness for ML models, one usually needs to solve a min-max problem of the
form minθ maxδ `(hθ(x+ δ), y), where θ denotes the parameters of the model h, δ is the perturbation and `(·)
∗The first two authors contribute equally to this work.
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Figure 1: In this paper, we define a robust training process RAB for classifiers. Given a poisoned dataset D′ —
produced by adding backdoor patterns ∆ by the attacker to some instances in the clean dataset D — this
robust training process guarantees that, for all test examples x, AD′(x) = AD(x), with high probability when
the magnitude of ∆ is within the certification radius.
the loss function for the training instance (x, y). Given the high degree of model complexity attributed to ML
models such as deep neural networks (DNNs), exactly solving this min-max problem can be NP-complete.
Therefore, in primal optimization, different methods are developed to encode the nonlinear activation
functions as linear constraints. For instance, NSVerify [27], MIPVerify [38], and ILP [2] are proposed. The
constraints can also be simplified through dual optimization. Representative methods for dual optimization
are Duality [14], ConvDual [44], and Certify [33]. Randomized smoothing is a recent approach that has
achieved state-of-the-art provable robustness guarantee against evasion attacks [21, 10, 48]. Intuitively, given
an input, a smoothed classifier outputs the class most likely to be returned by a base classifier given an input
which has been randomly perturbed by certain smoothing noise.
Despite these recent developments on provable robustness against evasion attacks, only empirical studies have
been conducted to defend against dataset poisoning attacks [41, 15], and the question of how to improve and
certify the robustness bound of given machine learning models against advanced poisoning attacks remains
largely unanswered. In particular, to our best knowledge, there are no provably robust strategies to deal with
backdoor attacks. Naturally, we wonder: Can we develop provably robust algorithms for this type of poisoning
attacks?
Poisoining is a popular family of attacks in which an attacker adds small patterns to a small set of training
instances such that the trained model is biased towards test images with the same pattern. Such attacks
can be applied to various real-world scenarios such as online face recognition systems [22, 8]. In this paper,
we present the first certification process to certify model robustness against backdoor attacks, which is the
most popular type of poisoning attacks against DNNs. Specifically, we focus on the following setting. Let
h(·| (xi, yi)ni=1) : Rd → Y, be a C-multiclass classifier, |Y| = C, which is trained with an n-example training
set {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}. For a test example x, we focus on the certification process that guarantees
n∑
i=1
‖δi‖p < R⇒ h(x| (xi, yi)ni=1) = h(x| (xi + δi, yi)ni=1).
Intuitively, this guarantees that the prediction of the classifier will stay consistently the same, no matter what
patterns the attacker adds to the training set as long as these patterns are within an Lp-ball of radius R.
Our technique to achieve this is mainly inspired by the recently proposed randomized smoothing techniques
against evasion attack [10] but goes significantly beyond simply applying known results. Our first contribution
is to develop a general theoretic framework for robustness conditions by generalizing randomized smoothing
to a much larger family of functions and smoothing distributions. This allows us to support cases in which a
classifier is a function that takes as input a test instance and a training set. With our framework, we can (1)
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provide robustness certificates against both evasion and dataset poisoning attacks; (2) certify any classifier which
takes as input a tuple of test instance and training dataset and (3) prove that this robustness condition provides a
tight robustness bound.
However, a general theoretical framework alone cannot provide reasonable certified radius for backdoor
attacks. Our second contribution is to instantiate our theoretical framework with practical optimizations. Our
optimizations can be classified into two categories: (1) Certification Radius and (2) Certification Efficiency.
To improve the certification radius, we certify DNN classifiers with a data augmentation scheme and in the
meantime, explore the impact of a differentially private training process and show that such inherently
“smoothed” models enjoy higher certified robustness. This provides some guidance of improving the certified
robustness against poisoning attacks and we hope it can inspire other researches in the future. To improve the
certification efficiency, we observed that for certain family of classifiers, namely K-nearest neighbor classifiers,
we can develop an efficient algorithm to compute the smoothing result exactly, eliminating the need to resort
to Monte Carlo algorithms as for generic classifiers.
Our third contribution is an extensive benchmark, evaluating our framework on multiple machine learning
models and provide the first collection of certified robustness bounds on a diverse range of datasets such as
MNIST, CIFAR-10, ImageNet, and a spambase tabular data as benchmarks. We hope that these experiments
and benchmarks can provide future directions for improving the robustness of machine learning models.
Being the first result on provable robustness against backdoor attacks, we have no doubt that these results
will be improved by follow-up work in the near future. We make the code and evaluation protocol publicly
available with the hope to facilitate future research for the community.
We summarize the contributions of our work as follows:
• We propose a unified framework to certify model robustness against both evasion and poisoning attacks
and prove that our robustness condition is tight.
• We provide the first certifiable robustness bound for general machine learning models against backdoor
poisoning attacks with smoothing noise sampled from different distributions.
• We propose an exact efficient smoothing algorithm for K-NN models without needing to sample random
noise during training.
• We also show that naturally smoothed models (e.g. differentially private models) can potentially achieve
higher certified robustness bound.
• We conduct extensive reproducible large-scale experiments and provide a benchmark on certified
robustness against three representative backdoor poisoning attacks for multiple models on diverse
datasets. 1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background of backdoor attacks
and related techniques, followed by the threat model in Section 3. Section 4 presents the proposed general
theoretical framework for certifying robustness against evasion and poisoning attacks, the tightness of the
derived robustness condition and sheds light on a connection between statistical hypothesis testing and
certifiable robustness. Section 5 explains in detail the proposed approach to certifying Robustness against
backdoor attacks using randomized smoothing with Gaussian and Uniform noise. Section 6 analyzes
robustness properties of DNNs, differentially private DNNs and K-NN classifiers and presents algorithms to
certify robustness for such models. Experimental results are presented in section 7. Finally, Section 8 puts our
results in context with existing work and Section 9 concludes.
1Our models and code are publicly available at https://github.com/AI-secure/Robustness-Against-Backdoor-Attacks.
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2 Background
In this section, we provide an overview for the backdoor poisoning attacks based on different categorization
criteria, the randomized smoothing strategies for certifying model robustness against evasion attacks, and a
brief overview of statistical hypothesis testing based on which we develop our general theoretic framework.
2.1 Backdoor (poisoning) attacks
A backdoor attack against an ML model aims to inject certain “backdoor” patterns during training and
associate such patterns with a specific adversarial target (label). As a result, during testing time, any test
instance with such a pattern will be misrecognized as the pre-selected adversarial target [18, 8]. Such models
with injected backdoors are called backdoored models which are able to achieve similar performance with
clean models on benign data, making it very challenging to detect such attacks.
There are several ways to categorize backdoor attacks. First, based on the adversarial target design, the attacks
can be characterized as single target attack and all-to-all attack. In a single target attack, the backdoor pattern
will cause the poisoned classifier to always return a designed target label. An all-to-all attack leverages the
backdoor pattern to permute the classifier results.
Based on the difference in backdoor patterns, there are region based and blending backdoor attacks. In the
region based attack, a specific region of the training instance is manipulated in a subtle way that will not
cause human notification [18, 24]. In particular, it has been shown that such backdoor patterns can be as
small as only one or four pixels [39]. On the other hand, Chen at al. [8] show that by blending the whole
instance with certain pattern such as a meaningful background or a fixed random pattern, it is also possible to
generate effective backdoors to poison the ML models.
In this work, we focus on certifying the robustness against general backdoor attacks, where the attacker is
able to add any specific or uncontrollable random backdoor patterns for arbitrary adversarial goals.
2.2 Improving learning robustness via randomized smoothing
Randomized smoothing has been studied by several works to certify model robustness against evasion attacks.
Some provide heuristic approaches to defend against adversarial examples [25, 4], and some provide theoretic
guarantees against Lp bounded adversarial perturbations. In particular, Cohen et al. [10] have proposed a
tight robustness guarantee in L2 norm with Gaussian noise smoothing.
On a high level, the randomized smoothing strategy [10] provides a way to certify the robustness of a
smoothed classifier against adversarial examples during test time. First, a given classifier is smoothed by
adding Gaussian noise ε ∼ N (0, σ21d) around each test instance. Then, the classification gap between a
lower bound of the confidence on the top-1 class pA and an upper bound of the confidence on the top-2 class
pB are obtained. The smoothed classifier will be guaranteed to provide consistent predictions within the
perturbation radius, which is a function of the smoothing noise variance σ, pA and pB , for each test instance.
However, all these approaches focus on the robustness against evasion attacks only, and in this work we aim
to first provide a general smoothing functional to certify the robustness against both evasion and poisoning
attacks. In particular, the current randomized smoothing strategy focuses on adding noise to smooth on the
level of test instance, while our unified framework generalizes it to smooth on the level of classifiers. We then
specifically describe the additional challenges of certifying robustness against poisoning backdoor attacks,
and provide theoretic robustness guarantees for different machine learning models, randomized smoothing
noise distributions, as well as the tightness of the robustness bounds.
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2.3 Statistical Hypothesis Testing
Statistical hypothesis testing is a statistical problem concerned with the question whether or not some
hypothesis that has been formulated is correct. A decision procedure for such a problem is called a statistical
hypothesis test. Formally, the decision is to be based on the value of a random variable X whose distribution
is known to be either P0 (the null hypothesis) or the alternative P1. 2 Given a sample x ∈ X , a randomized
test φ can be modeled as a function φ : X → [0, 1] which rejects the null hypothesis with probability φ(x)
and accepts it with probability 1 − φ(x). In the case where φ only takes the values {0, 1} we speak of a
nonrandomized test and call the set of points φ(x) = 1 the rejection region of the test. The problem is to
select the test φ which maximizes
β(φ) := E1 (φ(X)) (1)
the probability of correctly identifying the alternative, subject to the condition that the probability of falsely
rejecting the null is below a threshold α0,
α(φ) := E0 (φ(X)) ≤ α0. (2)
The value α(φ) is also known as the significance level of the test φ, while β(φ) is known as the power. A
likelihood ratio test is a test which compares the null hypothesis against the alternative based on their
likelhiood ratio. Formally, if f0 and f1 denote the density functions of P0 and P1 with respect to a measure µ,
a likelihood ratio test φ is defined as
φ(x) =

1 if Λ(x) > t,
q if Λ(x) = t,
0 if Λ(x) < t.
with Λ(x) =
f1(x)
f0(x)
, (3)
where q and t are chosen such that φ has significance α0, i.e.
α(φ) = P0 (φ(X) = 1) + q · P0(φ(X) = q) (4)
= P0 (Λ(X) > t) + q · P0(Λ(X) = t) = α0. (5)
The Neyman-Pearson Lemma [32] states that the likelihood ratio test is the most powerful test among all
tests at a given significance level α0. In Section 4 we will use this formalism to derive a generic robustness
condition for classification models expressible in terms of the power of hypothesis tests. The argument to
obtaining this result is based on the Neyman-Pearson Lemma which, in addition, is the core reason as to why
the obtained condition is tight.
3 Threat Model
We will first provide a detailed threat model analysis for poisoning attacks, especially backdoor attacks against
general machine learning models including deep neural networks [18, 22]; and then specify the threat model
considered in this paper and emphasize its generality. Concretely, the threat model consists of the definition
of the adversary’s goal, knowledge of the attacked system, and capability of manipulating or poisoning the
training process.
Adversary’s goal is to inject “backdoors” during the machine learning model training phase, so that predictions
on specific test instances will be modified during test. There are potentially two types of poisoning attacks
based on the adversary’s goal: availability attack and integrity attack. If the adversary aims to affect prediction
2In general, the null hypothesis is formulated as the distribution of X belonging to a family of distributions P0 = {Pθ : θ ∈ H0}
versus the alternatives P1 = {Pθ : θ ∈ H1} with H0 ∩H1 = ∅. If H0 and H1 only contain a single element, then we speak of simple
hypothesis testing which is the problem described here.
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indiscriminately, i.e., to cause a denial of service, it is called availability attack [22]. On the other hand, if the
adversary’s goal is to cause specific mis-predictions during the test phase while preserving the predictions on
the other test instances, it is referred to as integrity attack [18, 13].
Adversary’s knowledge enables two types of poisoning attacks: white-box and black-box attacks. In the
white-box attack scenario, the attacker is assumed to have knowledge about the training data Dtrain and the
learning algorithm L, as well as the model parameters θ. This way, it is possible for the attacker to synthesize
the optimal poisoning instances to attack different machine learning models with low poisoning ratio [30, 3].
In the black-box attack, the attacker has no knowledge about the training data or ML models, and can only
collect and contribute additional training data [18]. This way, either the transferable poisoning attack or the
model agnostic poisoning attack would be performed [51, 42].
Adversary’s capability in poisoning attack is usually limited by the number of poisoning instances that can
be injected and the manipulations added to each poisoning instance. Lower poisoning ratio would help to
preserve the model performance on benign test data, and smaller manipulation for each poisoning instance
would imply lower chance to be detected. In addition, the adversary can generate either fixed or dynamic
backdoor patterns [35] to ensure the hardness of being detected.
3.1 General backdoor based poisoning attack
In this paper, based on Kerckhoffs’s principle [37] we aim to certify the learning robustness against the
strongest attacker, who aims to perform an integrity attack with white-box access to the learning model. In
particular, we allow the attacker to design different backdoor patterns with their chosen poisoning ratio, backdoor
magnitude, location, position, and we also allow the attacker to generate different backdoors for different instances
dynamically [35]. To our best knowledge, this is the first work to provide certifiable robustness against general
backdoor attacks.
To demonstrate the generalizability, we specifically analyze a range of backdoor patterns from small ones
such as one pixel and four-pixel, and large ones which are based on the whole instance such as the “blending
attack” [26, 13].
3.2 Formal definition and defense goal
Given a training set of labelled training instances D, the learner’s task is to learn a classifier h : Rd → Y to
label test instances. The task of the adversary is to poison the training set by by replacing r training instances
(xi, yi) by poisoned instances (xi + δi, yAi ) where y
A
i is the designed adversarial target. Given the poisoned
training set, the defender will obtain a poisoned classifier hA. Here we allow that the set of r backdoors δi
may be comprised of either distinct patterns or just a single one. The goal of the adversary is that, during
test time, given any test instance x, hA(x+ δi) = yAi where y
A
i represents the adversarial target which could
be a single or an all-to-all attack. As a defender, the goal is to certify the learning robustness of a smoothed
classifier g given a base classifier h, such that during test time the smoothed classifier will always provide the
same prediction for a test instance no matter what pattern is added to the training set: g(x+ δ) = gA(x+ δ),
where gA denotes the backdoored model. We will show that the only condition that the patterns δi need to
satisfy is that their Lp-norm needs to be bounded, and this bound is a function of the smoothing distributions
and the confidence gap between the top two classes predicted by the smoothed classifier.
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4 Unified Framework for Certified Robustness
In this section, we propose a unified theoretical framework for certified robustness against evasion and
poisoning attacks on general machine learning models. Our framework is based on the intuition that
randomizing the prediction and training process decreases the vulnerability of classifiers against carefully
chosen adversarial attacks. This principle has been successfully applied to certify robustness against evasion
attacks on classification models [10].
4.1 Preliminaries
In a general form, ML models can be viewed as a general function that maps input information, typically
encoded as a vector of numerical values, to an output which is typically a real number for regression and a
label for classification. In this paper, we focus on multiclass classification models and view the prediction as a
unified process including the training dataset and the test instance.
Classification Models Given this view on the classification process, we define a classifier as a deterministic
function h : Rd × (Rd × C)n → C that maps a feature vector and a training set (containing n training samples)
jointly to a label from the set C = {1, . . . , C} where C denotes the number of classes. Formally, a prediction
from this type of models is obtained by first mapping a feature vector x and a training set D = (xi, yi)ni=1 to
a vector of class probabilities y(x, D) = (y1(x, D), . . . , yK(x, D)) such that
∑
k yk(x, D) = 1. The model h
then returns the most likely class h(x, D) = arg maxk yk(x, D). We call the function y outputting the class
probabilities the scoring function. In the remainder of this paper we refer to h as the base classifier with scoring
function y.
Smoothed Classifiers From a high-level viewpoint, we obtain a smoothed classifier g from a base classifier h
by introducing additive noise to the prediction process. The intuition behind randomized smoothing classifiers
is that noise reduces the occurrence of regions with high curvature in the decision boundaries, resulting in
reduced vulnerability to adversarial attacks. For our definition of smoothed classifiers, we first introduce the
three types of noise variables, each applied to a different part of the prediction process:
• A noise variable X which is added to a test instance and takes values in Rd,
• a set of n independent, identically distributed noise variables W1, . . . , Wn which are added to training
feature vectors and take values in Rd. We write
W := (W1, . . . , Wn)
for the tuple of the random variables Wi,
• a set of n independent, identically distributed noise variables V1, . . . , Vn which are added (modulo C)
to the training labels and take values in N0. We write
V := (V1, . . . , Vn)
for the tuple of the random variables Vi.
Each of these random variables corresponds to smoothing over a different part of the prediction process:
ε is used for test time smoothing, E for smoothing over the training feature vectors and K corresponds to
smoothing over the training labels. Given a base classifier h with scoring function y, we define the smoothed
classifier to be the expectation of y with input x and training set D perturbed with additive noise X, W and
V :
gZ(x, D) = E (y (x+X, D + (W, V ))) (6)
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where Z = (X, W, V ) ∈ Rd × (Rd × N)n and the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of Z.
The addition D+ (W, V ) in the right hand side of (6) is to be understood as element-wise addition in the first
argument, and addition modulo C in the second (label) argument so that gZ is a well defined classifier. We
notice that with this formulation of a smoothed classifier, we can also model “classical” randomized smoothing
for defending against evasion attacks by setting W ≡ 0, V ≡ 0.
4.2 A General Condition for Provable Robustness
In this section, we derive a robustness condition by drawing a connection between statistical hypothesis
testing and robustness of classification models subject to adversarial attacks. We allow adversaries to conduct
an attack on either (i) the test instance x, (ii) the training set D or (iii) a combined attack on test instance
and training set. The resulting robustness condition is of a general nature and is expressed in terms of the
power of likelihood ratio tests with significance levels related to the confidence of the prediction on benign
input data. In Section 5 we will show how this result can be used to obtain a robustness bound in terms of
Lp-norms of the injected backdoor pattern.
Theorem 1. Let Z = (X, W, V ) be a random variable with values in Rd× (Rd×N0)n and with density fZ with
respect to a measure µ. Let δ ∈ Rd and ∆ := (δi, γi)ni=1 ∈ (Rd × N0)n be attack patterns. Let pA, pB ∈ [0, 1]
and suppose that
gZkA(x, D) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ maxk 6=kA g
Z
k (x, D). (7)
Then there exist likelihood ratio tests φA and φB for testing Z against Z ′ := (δ,∆) + Z with significance levels
α(φA) = 1− pA and α(φB) = pB , such that if the powers of the tests satisfy
β(φB) < 1− β(φA) (8)
it is guaranteed that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆) > maxk 6=kA
gZk (x+ δ, D + ∆). (9)
The following is a short sketch of the detailed proof of Theorem 1 provided in Appendix A
Proof (Sketch). We first explicitly construct likelihood ratio tests φA and φB for testing the null hypothesis Z
against the alternative Z ′ with significance levels 1− pA and pB . In a second step we show that the prediction
score for class kA by the smoothed classifier gZ is greater than the significance of the test φA. An argument
similar to the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [32] then shows that the prediction score for kA given by gZ on
the perturbed input is lower bounded by 1 − β(φA). A similar reasoning leads to the fact that an upper
bound on the prediction score for k 6= kA on the perturbed input is given by β(φB). Combining this leads to
condition (8).
We now make some observations about Theorem 1 in order to get some intuition on the robustness condi-
tion (8):
• The random variable Z ′ models the adversarial attack and can be interpreted as a distributional shift
that occurrs in the smoothing noise distribution due to the attack.
• If no adversarial attack is present, i.e. if (δ, ∆) = (0, 0), then Z = Z ′ and the power of a statistical test
is the same as its significance level. In this case, we get the trivial condition that pA > pB .
• As pA approaches 1, both φA and φB are tests with significance approaching 0 which means that the
rejection region approaches a set of measure 0 under the distribution of Z. This means that the statistical
distance between the null Z and the alternative Z ′ can increase for fixed power of the tests. Intuitively,
since the distance between Z and Z ′ is governed purely by the perturbations (δ, ∆), this means that the
norm of δ and ∆ can increase while the condition β(φB) < 1− β(φA) is still being satisfied.
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• Different smoothing distributions lead to robustness bounds in terms of different norms. For example,
Gaussian noise yields a robustness bound in L2 while Uniform noise leads to robustness radii in general
Lp-norms.
• The robustness condition (8) does not make any assumptions on the underlying classifier other than on
the class probabilities predicted by its smoothed version.
While the generality of this statement allows to model a multitude of threat models, it bears the challenge
of how one should instantiate this theorem such that it is applicable to defend against a specific adversarial
attack. In addition to the flexibility with regards to the underlying threat model, we are also provided with
flexibility with regards to the smoothing distributions, resulting in different robustness guarantees. This again
comes with the question, which smoothing distributions result in useful robustness bounds. In Section 5,
we will show how this theorem can be used to obtain provable robustness against dataset poisoning and in
particular backdoor attacks.
The next proposition shows that Z and (δ,∆) + Z having non-disjoint support is a necessary condition on the
adversarial perturbations (δ, ∆) such that (8) can be satisfied. This sheds light on the dynamics governing
the robustness condition (8): if the smoothing distribution Z has compact support, then it is impossible to
certify perturbations (δ, ∆) which move Z ′ ”far away” from Z. This result then provides us with an idea on
the maximal possible robustness bound that can be achieved.
Proposition 1. If Z and Z ′ := (δ,∆) + Z have disjoint support, then condition (8) cannot be satisfied.
Proof. If Z and Z ′ have disjoint supports, then the null hypothesis (Z) can be distinguished from the
alternative (Z ′) by a single observation and with zero probability of error, since fZ(z) = 0 ⇐⇒ fZ′(z) 6= 0
for any z ∈ supp(Z) ∪ supp(Z ′). The hypotheses can thus be distinguished in a deterministic way and hence
any likelihood ratio test has power β(φ) = E(φ(Z ′)) = 1. In particular, this holds for the tests φA and φB and
thus
1 = β(φB) < 1− β(φA) = 0 (10)
which can never be satisfied.
For example, suppose Z = (X, 0, 0) with X ∼ U [0, 1]. As a consequence of Proposition 1 we immediately see
that it is not possible to certify input perturbations δ with absolute value larger than 1, because otherwise Z
and δ + Z would have disjoint supports.
The next Theorem shows that our robustness condition is tight in the following sense: If (7) is all that is
known about the smoothed classifier gZ , then it is impossible to certify a perturbation (δ,∆) that violates (8).
In other words, if (8) is violated, then we can always construct a smoothed classifier such that it satisfies the
prediction confidence assumption (7) but is not robust for this perturbation.
Theorem 2. Suppose that pA + pB ≤ 1. If the adversarial perturbations (δ, ∆) violate (8), then there exists a
base classifier h consistent with the class probabilities (7) and for which arg maxk gZk (x+ δ, D + ∆) 6= kA.
Proof (sketch). We show tightness by constructing a score function y, which is consistent with the class
probabilities (7) but whose smoothed version is not robust if the adversarial perturbations violate (8). The
score function is based in the likelihood ratio tests φA and φB and their signficance levels. This shows that
the correspoding smoothed classifier satisfies (7). Then, in a second step, it is shown that the violation
of the robustness condition (8) leads to an inconsistent classification for this particular classifier given the
adversarial inputs. A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B.
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5 Certified Robustness Against Backdoor Poisoning Attacks
It is not straightforward to use the result from Theorem 1 to get a robustness certificate against backdoor
attacks in terms of Lp-norms of injected backdoor patterns. In this section, we aim to answer the question:
How can we instantiate this result to obtain robustness guarantees against backdoor attacks? In addition —
due to its generality — we derive robustness bounds for smoothing with isotropic Gaussian noise. We also
illustrate how to derive certification bounds using other distributions; however, we will use isotropic Gaussian
noise in our experiments because it leads to a better radius.
Intuition. Suppose that we are given a base classifier which was trained on a poisoned dataset that contains r
training samples infected with the trojan pattern δ. Suppose we know that the smoothed (poisoned) classifier
is confident in predicting a malicious input x+ δ to be of a given class kA. Our goal is to derive a condition on
the pattern δ such that the prediction for x+ δ is the same as the prediction that a smoothed classifier would
have made, had it been trained on a dataset that is not infected with the backdoor patterns δ. In other words,
we obtain the guarantee that an attacker can not achieve their goal of systematically leading the test instance
with the backdoor pattern to the adversarial target, meaning they will always obtain the same prediction as
long as the added pattern δ satisfies certain conditions (bounded magnitude). The intention of the attacker —
carrying out a backdoor attack — has thus failed.
Method Overview. We obtain this certificate by instantiating Theorem 1 in the following way. Suppose an
attacker injects backdoor patterns δi ∈ Rd to r < n training instances of the training set D and suppose
the training set also includes flipped labels. We then train the base classifier on this poisoned dataset
augmented with additional noise on the feature vectors but not on the labels3 D+ (δi +Wi, γi)ni=1 and obtain
a prediction of the smoothed classifier gZ by taking the expectation with respect to the noise distribution
Z = (0, (Wi, 0)
n
i=1). Suppose that the smoothed classifier obtained in this way predicts the malicious test
instance x+ δ to be of a certain class with confidence pA and the runner-up class with probability pB. Our
result then tells us that as long as the introduced patterns satisfy condition (8), we get the guarantee that
the malicious test instance would have been classified equally had the classifier been trained on the training
set that does not contain the patterns δi. In the case where the noise variables are isotropic Gaussians with
standard deviation σ, the condition (8) yields a robustness bound in terms of the sum of L2-norms of the
backdoor patterns
√∑
i ‖δi‖22 < σ2 (Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)) where Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard Gaussian
CDF.
Corollary 1 (Gaussian Smoothing). For i = 1, . . . , n let δ, δi ∈ Rd, be backdoor patterns and let γi ∈ N0
denote label flips. Let ∆x := (δi, 0)ni=1, ∆y := (0, γi)
n
i=1. For i = 1, . . . , n let Wi ∼ N (0, σ21d) be independent
isotropic Gaussian noise, and set W := (W1, . . . ,Wn) and Z = (0, W, 0). Suppose that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆x + ∆y) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ maxk 6=kA g
Z
k (x+ δ, D + ∆x + ∆y). (11)
Then, if √√√√ n∑
i=1
‖δi‖22 <
σ
2
(
Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)
)
(12)
it is guaranteed that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆y) > maxk 6=kA
gZk (x+ δ, D + ∆y). (13)
We can further simplify the robustness bound in (12) if we can assume that an attacker poisons at most r ≤ n
training instances with one single pattern δ. In this case the bound (12) is given by
‖δ‖2 <
σ
2
√
r
(
Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)
)
. (14)
3We apply Noise only on the feature vectors and do not explicitly defend against label flipping.
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We see that as we know more about the capabilities of an attacker and the nature of the backdoor patterns we
are able to certify a larger robustness radius, proportional to the reciprocal of
√
r.
Discussion: Other Smoothing Distributions. Given the generality of our framework, it is possible to derive
certification bounds using other smoothing distributions. However, different smoothing distributions have
vastly different performance and a comparative study among different smoothing distributions are interesting
future work. In this paper, we just illustrate one example of smoothing using uniform distribution.
Corollary 2 (Uniform Smoothing). For i = 1, . . . , n let δ, δi ∈ Rd, be backdoor patterns and let γi ∈ N0 denote
label flips. Let ∆x := (δi, 0)ni=1, ∆y := (0, γi)
n
i=1. For i = 1, . . . , n let Wi ∼ U([a, b]d) be independent and
uniformly distributed noise, and set W := (W1, . . . ,Wn) and Z = (0, W, 0). Suppose that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆x + ∆y) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ maxk 6=kA g
Z
k (x+ δ, D + ∆x + ∆y). (15)
Then, if
1−
(
pA − pB
2
)
<
n∏
i=1
 d∏
j=1
(
1− |δi,j |
b− a
)
+
 (16)
where (x)+ = max{x, 0}, it is guaranteed that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆y) > maxk 6=kA
gZk (x+ δ, D + ∆y). (17)
Similar to the Gaussian case, we can again simplify the robustness bound in (16) if we assume that an attacker
poisons at most r ≤ n training instances with one single pattern δ. In this case the bound (16) is given by
1−
(
pA − pB
2
)
<
 d∏
j=1
(
1− |δj |
b− a
)
+
r . (18)
We see again that, as the number of infected training samples r gets smaller, this corresponds to a larger
bound since the RHS of (18) gets larger. In other words if we know that the attacker injects fewer patterns,
then we can certify a perturbations with larger magnitude.
6 Instantiating the General Framework with Specific ML Models
In previous sections, we presented our robustness certificate for backdoor attacks based on applying random-
ized smoothing to the entire training process. We show that, for general classification models, it is possible to
achieve robust predictions even though the training data has been poisoned. In this section, we analyze three
types of machine learning models in detail: deep neural networks, differentially private deep neural networks
and K-nearest neighbor classifiers.
The success of backdoor poisoning attacks against deep neural networks has caused a lot of attention recently.
Therefore, we first aim to evaluate and certify the robustness of DNNs against this type of attack on diverse
datasets.
Secondly, our goal is to understand more about the properties of differentially private models that could
potentially lead to learning robustness; the intuition is that differentially private neural networks are already
“smoothed” on the given training data with the original intention of minimizing the sensitivity of learned
models. Our hypothesis is that such smoothed models will achieve higher certified robustness against
poisoning attacks based on our certifiable training process.
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Thirdly, given the fact that K-NN models have been widely applied in different applications either based on
raw data or trained embeddings, it is of great interest to know about the robustness of this type of ML models.
Specifically, we are inspired by a recent result developed by the database community [23] and apply similar
techniques to develop an efficient smoothing algorithm for K-NN models, such that we do not need to draw a
large number of random samples from the smoothing distribution Z for these models
6.1 Deep Neural Networks
In this section, we consider smoothed models which use DNNs as base classifiers. The goal is to calculate
the prediction of gZ on (x+ δ,D + ∆) as in Corollary 1 and the corresponding certified bound given in the
right hand side of (12). In order to evaluate smoothed DNN classifiers we proceed in the following way. First,
we draw N samples w1, . . . , wN from the distribution of W ∼
∏n
i=1N (0, σ21d)) Given the N samples of
training noise (each consisting of n noise vectors), we train N DNN models on the datasets D + (wk, 0) and
obtain classifiers h1, . . . , hN . The prediction of the smoothed classifier on xtest is then computed by using the
empirical mean as an unbiased estimate:
gˆZ(x, D) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
y(xtest, D + (z
W
k , 0)).
This is then used to estimate the class probabilities pˆA and pˆB . Finally, for a given error tolerance α, we use
Hoeffding’s inequality to compute pA and pB according to
pA = pˆA −
√
log 1/α
2 ·N , pB = pˆB +
√
log 1/α
2 ·N .
Algorithm 1 DNN-RAB algorithm for estimating the pre-
diction and robust radius of smoothed DNN classifiers.
Input: (Poisoned) Training dataset D = {(xi, yi)ni=1},
test data xtest, noise scale σ, model number N , error
rate α.
/* Train models using smoothed dataset. */
1: for k = 1, . . . , N do
2: Sample zk,1, . . . , zk,n
iid∼ N (0, σ21d).
3: Dk = {(xi + zk,i, yi)ni=1}.
4: hk = train model(Dk).
5: uk = Nhash(hk)(0, σ21d).
6: end for
/* Calculate empirical estimation of pA and pB . */
7: gˆ = 1N
∑N
k=1 hk(xtest + uk).
8: pˆA, cA = maxc gˆc, arg maxc gˆc.
9: pˆB = maxc 6=cA gˆc.
/* Calculate lower & upper bounds of pA and pB . */
10: pA, pB = calculate bound(pˆA, pˆB , N, α).
11: if pA > pB then
12: R = σ2
(
Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)
)
13: return prediction cA, robust radius R.
14: else
15: return ABSTAIN.
16: end if
The computation of the certified radius is then
based on these values. However, empirically, we
observed that this leads to poor prediction perfor-
mance since the ensemble of models hk have to
classify an input that has not been perturbed by
Gaussian noise, while hk have only “seen noisy
samples. In the following we show a novel way to
address this challenge.
Model-deterministic Test-time Augmentation.
One caveat in directly applying Equation (6.1) is
the mismatch of the training distribution and the
test distribution — during training all examples
are perturbed with sampled noise whereas the
test example is without noise. In practice, we
see that this mismatch significantly decreases the
test accuracy (see Section 7). One natural idea is
to also add noise to the test examples, however,
this requires careful design (e.g., simply drawing
k independent noise vectors and apply them to
Equation (6.1) will cause problems in theory and
lead to a loosen bound).
We modify the inference function given a learned
model hk in the following way. Instead of directly
classifying an unperturbed input xtest, we use the
hash value of the trained hk model parameters as
12
Figure 2: An illustration of the RAB robust training process. Given a poisoned training set D + ∆ and a
training process A vulnerable to backdoor attacks, RAB generates N smoothed training sets {Di}i∈[N ] and
trains N different classifiers Ai.
the random seed and sample uk ∼ Nhash(hk)(0, σ21d). In practice we use SHA256 hashing[43] of the trained
model file. In this way, the noise we add is a deterministic function of the trained model, which is equivalent
of altering the inference function in a deterministic way: h˜k(xtest) = hk(xtest + uk). As we will show in
the experiments, this leads to significantly better prediction performance in practice. Pseudocode for our
proposed DNN-RAB training procedure is shown in Alg. 1.
6.2 Differentially Private Models
Based on the intuition that the “smoothed” model is expected to be more robust against attacks, in this section
we provide a way to verify this assumption and further provide guidance about how to improve the certified
robustness of machine learning models against poisoning attacks.
In the proposed RAB training procedure, we directly smooth the training process by adding smoothing noise
zi sampled from Z = (X, (W, V )) at each time and then train a corresponding model as shown in Figure 2.
The k-th trained model can be represented as
θk = arg min
θ
n∑
i=1
`(hθ(xi + z
(2)
k,i ), yi ⊕C z(3)k,i ) (19)
To assess the effects of the model smoothness on the certified robustness bound, we improve the model
training process with differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) [1]. During each iteration
of training the model hk, we add certain noise to the gradient to reduce its dependency on specific training
data and then clip the gradient to a predefined range. Intuitively, this process will add another level of
“smoothness” to the model training which is encoded in the model parameters θk. The hope is that this
procedure will lead to a larger gap between pA and pB and subsequently provide a higher certified robustness
radius. Note that DP-SGD is just one way to provide a smoothed model training process and therefore improve
model robustness. It is flexible to plug in any other smoothing strategy to the proposed RAB framework to
enhance the learning robustness against poisoning backdoor attacks.
6.3 K-Nearest Neighbors
If the base classifier h is given by a K-nearest neighbor classifier, we can evaluate the corresponding smoothed
classifier analytically and thus compute the confidence levels pA and pB exactly, opposed to the approximation
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needed in the case for other types of base classifiers. In what follows, we show that this computation can
be performed with time complexity polynomial in the number of training instances in the case where the
smoothing distribution is given by isotropic Gaussian noise and similarity is measured in terms of quantized
euclidean distance.
A textbook K-NN classifier works in the following way: Given a training set D = (xi, yi)ni=1 and a test example
x, we first calculate the similarity between x and each xi, si := κ(xi, x) where κ is a similarity function. Given
all these similarity scores {si}i, we choose the K most similar training examples with the largest similarity
score {xσi}Ki=1 along with corresponding labels {yσi}Ki=1. The prediction is then made according to a majority
vote among the top-K labels.
Similar to DNNs, we obtain a smoothed K-NN classifier by adding Gaussian noise to training points and
evaluate the expectation with respect to this noise distribution
gZk (x, D) = P (KNN(x, D + (W, 0)) = k) (20)
where Z = (0, (W, 0)) with W ∼ N (0, σ21). The next theorem shows that (20) can be computed exactly and
efficiently when we measure similarity with respect euclidean distance quantized into finitely many similarity
levels.
Theorem 3. Given n training instances, a C-multiclass K-NN classifier based on quantized euclidean distance
with L similarity levels, smoothed with isotropic Gaussian noise can be evaluated exactly with time complexity
O(K2+C · n2 · L · C).
Proof (sketch). The first step to computing (20) is to notice that we can summarize all possible arrangements
{xσi +Wσi}Ki=1 of top-K instances leading to a prediction by using tally vectors γ ∈ [K]C . A tally vector has
as its k-th element the number of instances in the top-K with label k, γk = #{yσi = k}. In the second step,
we partition the event that a tally vector γ occurs into events where an instance i with similarity β is in the
top-K but would not be in the top-(K − 1). These first two steps result in a summation over O(KC · n · L ·C)
many terms. In the last step, we compute the probabilities of the events {tally γ ∧ κ(xi +Wi, x) = β} with
dynamic programming in O(n ·K2) steps, resulting in a final time complexity of O(K2+C · n2 · L · C).
If K = 1, then an efficient algorithm can even achieve time complexity linear in the number of training
samples n. We refer the reader to Appendix D for a detailed proof of Theorem 3 and the algorithm details.
7 Experimental Results
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to provide a benchmark for the certified robustness bound
of different types of machine learning models on diverse datasets. In particular, we evaluate the DNNs,
differentially private DNNs, and K-NN on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. We consider three different types
of backdoor patterns, namely one pixel, four pixel and blending attacks. Furthermore, we also evaluate a
K-NN model on a tabular data spambase dataset to assess the advantages of our efficient algorithm for K-NN
classifiers.
7.1 Experiment Setup
We provide the first benchmark on certified robustness bounds against backdoor attacks against different ML
models on MNIST [20], CIFAR-10 [19] and ImageNet [11] datasets. Following the backdoor attack setting
as in [39, 8], we train a DNN model to classify between the (source, target) label pair on each task. The
goal of the attacker is to inject a backdoor pattern during training such that a source input infected with the
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Table 1: Evaluation metrics for test set of size m
Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r Certified Rate at r
1
m
∑m
i=1 1{ci = yi} 1m
∑m
i=1 1{ci = yi and ri > r} 1m
∑m
i=1 1{ri > r}
pattern will be classified as the adversarial target. We choose two pairs for each task, namely (0,1) and (8,6)
for MNIST, (airplane, bird) and (automobile, dog) for CIFAR, (dog, cat) and (dog, fish) for ImageNet. The
training set sizes are 12,665 and 11,769 on MNIST, 10,000 and 10,000 on CIFAR and 20,000 and 10,000 on
ImageNet respectively.
We use the CNN architecture in [17] on MNIST and the ResNet used in [10] on CIFAR-10. On ImageNet, we
use the standard ResNet-20 architecture.
We evaluate three representative backdoor patterns: a specific one-pixel pattern in the middle of the image, a
four-pixel pattern, and blending a noise pattern to the entire image. The backdoor is generated such that the
perturbation norm for each pattern is bounded by the `2 norm ‖δ‖2. For each attack, we add rp backdoor
training instances whose ground truth is the source class aiming to mislead the prediction of test instances
with the pattern to the target label.
In order to estimate the bounds of pA and pB for DNN base classifiers, we train N = 1, 000 smoothed models
on MNIST and CIFAR, and N = 200 smoothed models on ImageNet according to Algorithm 1. We then use
Hoeffding’s inequality to approximate the bounds with an error rate of α = 0.001. We use the smoothing
parameters σ = 1.0, 2.0 on MNIST and σ = 0.5, 1.0 on CIFAR and ImageNet.
Besides the vanilla DNNs, we also use the differentially private training algorithm (DP-SGD) as proposed
in [1] to further smooth a trained model on the instance level. We set the gradient clip norm to be
C = 5.0, 100.0, 1000.0 and add Gaussian noise with scale σDP = 4.0, 0.1, 0.01 in the gradient calculation for
MNIST, CIFAR and ImageNet, respectively. In the K-NN approach, we use L = 200 buckets.
As for the K-NN models, besides the image datasets we evaluate it with an additional spambase tabular
dataset to demonstrate its effectiveness. In particular, we use the UCI Spambase dataset [12] which gives
bag-of-word feature vectors on e-mails and determines whether the message is spam or not. The dataset
contains 4,601 data cases with a 57-dimensional input. We use 80% of the data as training set to fit the K-NN
model and the remaining 20% for evaluation. As for the backdoor attack, we randomly add backdoor patterns
on one (or four) input dimensions, or a random pattern to the entire input vector similar with the blending
attack.
We report our results with three metrics: prediction accuracy, certified rate and certified accuracy. Given the
i-th test case with ground truth label yi, the output prediction is either ci within radius ri or ci = ABSTAIN
at ri = 0. Given a test set of size m, the three evaluation metrics are calculated according to the evaluation
metrics defined in Table 1.
The prediction accuracy indicates how well the smoothed (backdoored) classifier performs in classifying new,
possibly backdoored, instances without taking into account their robustness radius. The certified rate at r is
given by the fraction of instances in the test set that can be certified at radius ri > r, indicating how consistent
the attacked classifier is with a clean one. Finally the certified accuracy at r combines the first two metrics: it
reports the fraction of the test set which is classified correctly (without abstaining) and is certified as robust
with a radius ri > r.
15
Table 2: Experiment results with DNN.
MNIST
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.2/0.5/1.0/2.0 Certified Rate at r = 0.2/0.5/1.0/2.0
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 1.000 0.996 / 0.796 / 0.000 / 0.000 0.996 / 0.796 / 0.000 / 0.000
2.0 0.995 0.995 / 0.991 / 0.744 / 0.000 0.995 / 0.991 / 0.744 / 0.000
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.986 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.986 / 0.000
2.0 1.000 0.999 / 0.998 / 0.993 / 0.708 0.999 / 0.998 / 0.993 / 0.708
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 1.000 0.997 / 0.530 / 0.000 / 0.000 0.997 / 0.530 / 0.000 / 0.000
2.0 0.996 0.994 / 0.987 / 0.640 / 0.000 0.994 / 0.987 / 0.640 / 0.000
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.990 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.990 / 0.000
2.0 1.000 0.999 / 0.998 / 0.993 / 0.725 0.999 / 0.998 / 0.993 / 0.725
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 0.985 / 0.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 0.985 / 0.000 / 0.000
2.0 0.997 0.995 / 0.991 / 0.744 / 0.000 0.995 / 0.991 / 0.744 / 0.000
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.992 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.992 / 0.000
2.0 1.000 0.999 / 0.997 / 0.993 / 0.728 0.999 / 0.997 / 0.993 / 0.728
CIFAR
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5 Certified Rate at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.733 0.683 / 0.615 / 0.389 / 0.000 0.811 / 0.717 / 0.455 / 0.005
1.0 0.656 0.624 / 0.588 / 0.487 / 0.085 0.789 / 0.741 / 0.604 / 0.137
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.833 0.805 / 0.770 / 0.687 / 0.295 0.892 / 0.846 / 0.735 / 0.298
1.0 0.790 0.768 / 0.749 / 0.714 / 0.555 0.880 / 0.847 / 0.796 / 0.593
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.737 0.685 / 0.618 / 0.423 / 0.000 0.805 / 0.710 / 0.485 / 0.005
1.0 0.656 0.617 / 0.585 / 0.490 / 0.090 0.790 / 0.735 / 0.612 / 0.145
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.838 0.808 / 0.775 / 0.696 / 0.284 0.892 / 0.847 / 0.741 / 0.287
1.0 0.794 0.768 / 0.746 / 0.702 / 0.546 0.883 / 0.848 / 0.785 / 0.585
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.736 0.669 / 0.599 / 0.376 / 0.000 0.797 / 0.702 / 0.444 / 0.006
1.0 0.662 0.622 / 0.595 / 0.498 / 0.133 0.792 / 0.748 / 0.617 / 0.193
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.834 0.809 / 0.774 / 0.699 / 0.284 0.889 / 0.842 / 0.741 / 0.288
1.0 0.798 0.770 / 0.754 / 0.712 / 0.550 0.885 / 0.858 / 0.793 / 0.588
ImageNet
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5 Certified Rate at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.781 0.718 / 0.656 / 0.424 / 0.000 0.758 / 0.688 / 0.439 / 0.000
1.0 0.604 0.562 / 0.519 / 0.424 / 0.104 0.635 / 0.578 / 0.463 / 0.120
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.907 0.887 / 0.864 / 0.810 / 0.230 0.905 / 0.880 / 0.818 / 0.230
1.0 0.816 0.796 / 0.775 / 0.740 / 0.580 0.828 / 0.804 / 0.761 / 0.588
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.791 0.742 / 0.664 / 0.407 / 0.000 0.779 / 0.691 / 0.424 / 0.000
1.0 0.630 0.596 / 0.560 / 0.466 / 0.120 0.656 / 0.612 / 0.502 / 0.132
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.910 0.894 / 0.869 / 0.808 / 0.200 0.914 / 0.886 / 0.818 / 0.200
1.0 0.808 0.792 / 0.768 / 0.724 / 0.574 0.829 / 0.799 / 0.747 / 0.580
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.774 0.716 / 0.639 / 0.386 / 0.000 0.755 / 0.666 / 0.403 / 0.000
1.0 0.600 0.564 / 0.523 / 0.440 / 0.114 0.632 / 0.583 / 0.484 / 0.129
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.906 0.888 / 0.865 / 0.810 / 0.272 0.907 / 0.878 / 0.819 / 0.272
1.0 0.811 0.792 / 0.776 / 0.732 / 0.571 0.826 / 0.808 / 0.755 / 0.577
7.2 Certified robustness of DNNs against backdoor attacks
We evaluate the certified robustness bound on DNNs against different backdoor patterns, and we present the
results for three evaluation metrics. Table 2 list the benchmark results on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet,
respectively. From the results, we can see that on MNIST, it is possible to obtain certified accuracy around
99.6% as long as the `2 norm of the backdoor patterns is within 0.5, and drops to around 70% as the radius
increases (e.g. ‖δ‖2 = 2). It can also be seen that larger smoothing noise during RAB training helps to achieve
higher certified accuracy and certified rate. Similar observations can be drawn for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet,
while the certified robustness is lower than that on MNIST.
7.3 Certified robustness of differentially private DNNs against backdoor attacks
In addition to vanilla DNNs, we provide the certified robustness benchmarks on differentially private trained
DNNs. Table 3 show the results on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. We can see that on MNIST the certified
robustness on such smoothly trained models is much higher than in the case of vanilla DNNs. This provides
further guidance on improving the robustness of ML models against backdoor attacks. On ImageNet and
CIFAR-10 however, we do not observe much improvement on certified accuracy compared to vanilla DNNs.
We expect further improvements on DP-SGD will help to improve the certified robustness since the DP-SGD is
known challenging to be applied on these datasets.
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Table 3: Experiment results of Smoothed Model.
MNIST
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.2/0.5/1.0/2.0 Certified Rate at r = 0.2/0.5/1.0/2.0
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.997 0.995 / 0.991 / 0.904 / 0.000 0.997 / 0.991 / 0.904 / 0.000
2.0 0.996 0.995 / 0.992 / 0.948 / 0.265 0.996 / 0.992 / 0.948 / 0.265
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.998 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.981 / 0.000 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.981 / 0.000
2.0 0.998 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.994 / 0.833 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.994 / 0.833
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.997 0.994 / 0.985 / 0.848 / 0.000 0.996 / 0.985 / 0.848 / 0.000
2.0 0.995 0.994 / 0.988 / 0.936 / 0.176 0.996 / 0.988 / 0.936 / 0.176
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.998 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.982 / 0.000 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.982 / 0.000
2.0 0.998 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.993 / 0.793 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.993 / 0.793
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.998 0.997 / 0.994 / 0.925 / 0.000 0.997 / 0.994 / 0.925 / 0.000
2.0 0.997 0.995 / 0.993 / 0.957 / 0.317 0.995 / 0.993 / 0.957 / 0.317
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.998 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.979 / 0.000 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.979 / 0.000
2.0 0.998 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.994 / 0.820 0.998 / 0.997 / 0.994 / 0.820
CIFAR
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5 Certified Rate at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.479 0.365 / 0.251 / 0.082 / 0.000 0.578 / 0.410 / 0.174 / 0.005
1.0 0.305 0.239 / 0.192 / 0.105 / 0.004 0.512 / 0.432 / 0.267 / 0.044
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.728 0.675 / 0.612 / 0.440 / 0.003 0.799 / 0.719 / 0.497 / 0.004
1.0 0.649 0.609 / 0.575 / 0.484 / 0.204 0.754 / 0.700 / 0.580 / 0.228
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.466 0.344 / 0.222 / 0.057 / 0.000 0.555 / 0.375 / 0.141 / 0.003
1.0 0.292 0.225 / 0.170 / 0.088 / 0.002 0.491 / 0.405 / 0.244 / 0.037
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.725 0.673 / 0.612 / 0.457 / 0.006 0.795 / 0.719 / 0.514 / 0.007
1.0 0.643 0.602 / 0.570 / 0.471 / 0.189 0.753 / 0.698 / 0.569 / 0.213
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.471 0.361 / 0.239 / 0.072 / 0.000 0.580 / 0.400 / 0.163 / 0.005
1.0 0.321 0.262 / 0.210 / 0.129 / 0.007 0.536 / 0.452 / 0.297 / 0.055
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.724 0.673 / 0.613 / 0.444 / 0.002 0.795 / 0.718 / 0.501 / 0.003
1.0 0.647 0.607 / 0.570 / 0.475 / 0.188 0.750 / 0.693 / 0.569 / 0.209
ImageNet
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5 Certified Rate at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.405 0.317 / 0.237 / 0.116 / 0.000 0.403 / 0.292 / 0.134 / 0.000
1.0 0.101 0.072 / 0.054 / 0.022 / 0.000 0.218 / 0.156 / 0.073 / 0.002
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.698 0.641 / 0.580 / 0.445 / 0.028 0.685 / 0.609 / 0.459 / 0.028
1.0 0.376 0.333 / 0.276 / 0.195 / 0.037 0.392 / 0.319 / 0.218 / 0.038
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.408 0.318 / 0.246 / 0.115 / 0.000 0.402 / 0.300 / 0.133 / 0.000
1.0 0.103 0.071 / 0.053 / 0.020 / 0.000 0.211 / 0.157 / 0.068 / 0.002
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.697 0.638 / 0.579 / 0.444 / 0.028 0.680 / 0.608 / 0.458 / 0.028
1.0 0.377 0.324 / 0.280 / 0.197 / 0.041 0.384 / 0.325 / 0.220 / 0.042
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.397 0.318 / 0.232 / 0.113 / 0.000 0.403 / 0.286 / 0.131 / 0.000
1.0 0.097 0.070 / 0.052 / 0.021 / 0.000 0.215 / 0.160 / 0.071 / 0.002
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.701 0.644 / 0.580 / 0.444 / 0.029 0.687 / 0.609 / 0.457 / 0.029
1.0 0.379 0.332 / 0.281 / 0.197 / 0.042 0.392 / 0.324 / 0.220 / 0.042
7.4 Certified robustness of K-NN models against backdoor attacks
In this section, we present the benchmarks based on our proposed efficient algorithm, which is designed for
K-NN models without requiring to sample from the smoothing noise distribution. We perform the experiments
on MNIST, CIFAR-10 and UCI spambase dataset. We show the results when K = 5 for MNIST, CIFAR-10 and
spam databases in Table 4 respectively. We can see that the K-NN models on MNIST and CIFAR-10 achieve
better certified rate and accuracy and we can certify a large radius. In addition, the K-NN model achieves
high certified accuracy and certified rate on tabular data, which indicates its advantages in specific domains.
The results for K = 1 are given in Table 5 In terms of the efficiency evaluation, we record the runtime of
the proposed efficient exact algorithm on K-NN. We observe that for certifying one input from CIFAR-10 on
K-NN(K = 5), using the exact algorithm takes only 60 seconds, which is around 6-7 times faster than the
vanilla RAB. It would be interesting future work to design similar efficient algorithm for DNNs.
8 Related Work
In this section, we discuss current poisoning backdoor attacks on machine learning models, as well as existing
defenses.
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Table 4: Exp results of KNN (K = 5).
MNIST
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.2/0.5/1.0/2.0 Certified Rate at r = 0.2/0.5/1.0/2.0
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 0.999 / 0.995 / 0.552 1.000 / 0.999 / 0.995 / 0.552
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.995 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.995
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 0.999 / 0.995 / 0.483 1.000 / 0.999 / 0.995 / 0.483
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.995 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.995
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.995 / 0.690 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.995 / 0.690
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.995 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.995
CIFAR
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5 Certified Rate at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.659 0.621 / 0.581 / 0.498 / 0.229 0.930 / 0.858 / 0.740 / 0.380
1.0 0.554 0.537 / 0.518 / 0.467 / 0.283 0.962 / 0.918 / 0.822 / 0.535
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.764 0.747 / 0.736 / 0.694 / 0.535 0.964 / 0.931 / 0.866 / 0.645
1.0 0.723 0.711 / 0.698 / 0.670 / 0.552 0.976 / 0.947 / 0.905 / 0.724
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.653 0.620 / 0.594 / 0.502 / 0.240 0.931 / 0.877 / 0.751 / 0.388
1.0 0.560 0.540 / 0.510 / 0.465 / 0.268 0.953 / 0.906 / 0.813 / 0.511
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.771 0.750 / 0.737 / 0.701 / 0.534 0.963 / 0.938 / 0.870 / 0.641
1.0 0.718 0.708 / 0.696 / 0.664 / 0.549 0.973 / 0.947 / 0.899 / 0.725
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.646 0.606 / 0.551 / 0.461 / 0.231 0.927 / 0.845 / 0.720 / 0.386
1.0 0.567 0.548 / 0.519 / 0.477 / 0.289 0.967 / 0.918 / 0.831 / 0.538
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.772 0.746 / 0.736 / 0.704 / 0.539 0.958 / 0.935 / 0.878 / 0.648
1.0 0.714 0.702 / 0.691 / 0.654 / 0.544 0.976 / 0.952 / 0.892 / 0.723
Spam
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5/1.0 Certified Rate at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5/1.0
One-dimension
‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.709 0.686 / 0.668 / 0.603 / 0.400 0.962 / 0.928 / 0.838 / 0.554
2.0 0.512 0.478 / 0.434 / 0.323 / 0.120 0.932 / 0.861 / 0.676 / 0.340
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.856 0.842 / 0.834 / 0.806 / 0.744 0.977 / 0.956 / 0.907 / 0.800
2.0 0.913 0.905 / 0.895 / 0.862 / 0.757 0.985 / 0.966 / 0.905 / 0.761
Four-dimension
‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.691 0.668 / 0.642 / 0.587 / 0.429 0.953 / 0.920 / 0.831 / 0.598
2.0 0.485 0.456 / 0.409 / 0.296 / 0.118 0.940 / 0.858 / 0.695 / 0.364
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.852 0.839 / 0.832 / 0.805 / 0.744 0.975 / 0.955 / 0.907 / 0.802
2.0 0.913 0.905 / 0.895 / 0.864 / 0.758 0.985 / 0.964 / 0.902 / 0.762
Blending
‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.710 0.694 / 0.663 / 0.596 / 0.437 0.966 / 0.917 / 0.829 / 0.574
2.0 0.550 0.516 / 0.483 / 0.414 / 0.167 0.937 / 0.881 / 0.749 / 0.381
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.857 0.843 / 0.834 / 0.809 / 0.747 0.971 / 0.955 / 0.910 / 0.802
2.0 0.914 0.905 / 0.897 / 0.868 / 0.760 0.980 / 0.964 / 0.906 / 0.763
8.1 Poisoning attacks
There have been several works developing optimal poisoning attacks against machine learning models such
as SVM and logistic regression [3, 22]. Furthermore, [31] proposes a similar optimization based poisoning
attack against neural network, that can only be applied to shallow MLP models. In addition to these
optimization based poisoning attacks, the backdoor attacks are shown to be very effective against deep neural
networks [8, 17]. The backdoor patterns could be either static or generated dynamically [47]. For static
backdoor patterns, it could be as small as one pixel, or as large as an entire image [8]. The backdoor instances
could be either generated with manipulated labels or clean labels [36]. In general, the poisoning ratio of
these backdoor attacks does not need to be very high to mislead the DNNs, which renders such attacks very
challenging to be detected.
8.2 Potential defenses against poisoning attacks
Given the potential severe consequences caused by backdoor attacks, multiple defense approaches have been
proposed. Cleanse [41] proposes to detect the backdoored models based on the observation that there exists a
“short path” to make an instance to be predicted as a malicious one. [7] improves upon the approach by using
model inversion to obtain training data, and then apply GANs to generate the “short path” and apply anomaly
detection algorithm as in Neural Cleanse. Activation Clustering [6] leverages the activation vectors from the
backdoored model as feature to detect backdoor instances. Spectral Signature [39] identifies the “spectral
signature” in the activation vector for backdoored instances. STRIP [15] proposes to identify the backdoor
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Table 5: Experiment results of KNN (K = 1).
MNIST
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.2/0.5/1.0/2.0 Certified Rate at r = 0.2/0.5/1.0/2.0
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 / 0.000
2.0 1.000 1.000 / 0.995 / 0.881 / 0.000 1.000 / 0.995 / 0.881 / 0.000
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000
2.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.996 / 0.679 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.996 / 0.679
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 / 0.000
2.0 1.000 1.000 / 0.995 / 0.860 / 0.000 1.000 / 0.995 / 0.860 / 0.000
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000
2.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.996 / 0.688 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.996 / 0.688
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 / 0.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.000 / 0.000
2.0 1.000 1.000 / 0.995 / 0.896 / 0.000 1.000 / 0.995 / 0.896 / 0.000
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.003 1.000 / 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.003
2.0 1.000 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.996 / 0.681 1.000 / 1.000 / 0.996 / 0.681
CIFAR
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5 Certified Rate at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5
One-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.662 0.609 / 0.534 / 0.374 / 0.088 0.879 / 0.767 / 0.552 / 0.155
1.0 0.564 0.527 / 0.471 / 0.351 / 0.056 0.926 / 0.825 / 0.641 / 0.209
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.781 0.751 / 0.714 / 0.624 / 0.301 0.945 / 0.886 / 0.758 / 0.351
1.0 0.721 0.701 / 0.676 / 0.609 / 0.399 0.956 / 0.909 / 0.801 / 0.517
Four-pixel ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.654 0.596 / 0.526 / 0.403 / 0.090 0.892 / 0.779 / 0.590 / 0.164
1.0 0.593 0.551 / 0.511 / 0.409 / 0.047 0.915 / 0.848 / 0.688 / 0.208
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.779 0.745 / 0.708 / 0.620 / 0.295 0.938 / 0.879 / 0.754 / 0.348
1.0 0.719 0.694 / 0.665 / 0.594 / 0.385 0.958 / 0.901 / 0.790 / 0.503
Blending ‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
0.5 0.612 0.535 / 0.465 / 0.321 / 0.076 0.861 / 0.744 / 0.530 / 0.154
1.0 0.555 0.519 / 0.479 / 0.356 / 0.054 0.925 / 0.838 / 0.645 / 0.215
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
0.5 0.776 0.743 / 0.712 / 0.616 / 0.289 0.938 / 0.884 / 0.750 / 0.340
1.0 0.720 0.694 / 0.669 / 0.599 / 0.381 0.953 / 0.907 / 0.799 / 0.498
Spam
Attack Approach Attack Setting σ Prediction Acc Certified Acc at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5/1.0 Certified Rate at r = 0.05/0.1/0.2/0.5/1.0
One-dimension
‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.725 0.689 / 0.643 / 0.565 / 0.120 0.942 / 0.875 / 0.761 / 0.183
2.0 0.579 0.529 / 0.473 / 0.285 / 0.033 0.892 / 0.775 / 0.522 / 0.098
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.869 0.847 / 0.830 / 0.782 / 0.657 0.959 / 0.928 / 0.855 / 0.661
2.0 0.924 0.906 / 0.894 / 0.836 / 0.646 0.965 / 0.922 / 0.840 / 0.646
Four-dimension
‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.710 0.676 / 0.625 / 0.525 / 0.093 0.937 / 0.862 / 0.710 / 0.156
2.0 0.580 0.539 / 0.479 / 0.299 / 0.038 0.894 / 0.780 / 0.539 / 0.103
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.869 0.846 / 0.829 / 0.781 / 0.659 0.958 / 0.929 / 0.850 / 0.663
2.0 0.925 0.912 / 0.897 / 0.843 / 0.652 0.960 / 0.919 / 0.847 / 0.652
Blending
‖δi‖2 = 1.0, rp = 0.1
1.0 0.729 0.699 / 0.641 / 0.550 / 0.119 0.953 / 0.870 / 0.726 / 0.162
2.0 0.588 0.546 / 0.482 / 0.323 / 0.035 0.903 / 0.779 / 0.562 / 0.103
‖δi‖2 = 0.1, rp = 0.02
1.0 0.867 0.845 / 0.829 / 0.780 / 0.659 0.957 / 0.929 / 0.852 / 0.662
2.0 0.927 0.913 / 0.896 / 0.842 / 0.655 0.962 / 0.924 / 0.846 / 0.655
instances by checking whether the model will still provide a confident answer when it sees the backdoor
pattern. SentiNet [9] leverages computer vision techniques to search for the parts in the image that contribute
the most to the model output, which are very likely to be the backdoor pattern. Finally, another interesting
application of randomized smoothing is presented in [34] to certify robustness against label-flipping attacks
and randomize over the entire training procedure of the classifier by randomly flipping labels in the training
set. This work is orthogonal to ours in that we investigate the robustness with respect to perturbations on
the training inputs rather than labels. In addition to these work aiming to certify the robustness for a single
model, [50] provides a new way to certify the robustness of an end to end sensing-reasoning pipeline.
Recently a short technical report also proposes to directly apply the randomized smoothing technique to
potentially certify robustness against backdoor attacks without any evaluation or analysis [40]. In addition,
as we have shown, directly applying randomized smoothing will not provide high certified robustness bounds.
Contrary to that, in this paper, we first provide the unified framework with smoothing functional, and then
propose the RAB robust training process to provide certified robustness against backdoor attacks. In particular,
we provide the tightness analysis for the robustness bound, analyze different smoothing distributions, and
propose the hash function based model deterministic test-time augmentation approach to achieve good
certified robustness. In addition, we analyze different machine learning models with corresponding properties
such as model smoothness to provide guidance to further improve the certified model robustness.
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9 Conclusion
In this paper, we aim to propose a unified smoothing framework to certify model robustness against different
attacks including evasion and poisoning attacks. In particular, towards the popular backdoor poisoning
attack, we propose the first robust smoothing training process as well as a model deterministic test-time
augmentation mechanism to certify the prediction robustness against diverse backdoor attacks. Based on
our framework, we also propose to certify the robustness against backdoors on vanilla DNNs, differentially
private smoothed DNNs, and K-NN models. In addition, we propose an exact algorithm for K-NN models
without requiring to sample from the smoothing noise distributions. We provide comprehensive benchmarks
of certified model robustness against backdoors on diverse datasets, which we believe will provide the first set
of model robustness against backdoor attacks for future work to compare with.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma A.1. Let X0 and X1 be two random variables with densities f0 and f1 with respect to a measure µ and
denote by Λ the likelihood ratio Λ(x) = f1(x)/f0(x). For p ∈ [0, 1] let tp := inf{t ≥ 0: P(Λ(X0) ≤ t) ≥ p}.
Then it holds that
P (Λ(X0) < tp) ≤ p ≤ P(Λ(X0) ≤ tp). (21)
Proof. We first show the RHS of inequality (21). This follows directly from the definition of tp if we show
that the function t 7→ P(Λ(X0) ≤ t) is right-continuous. Let t ≥ 0 and let {tn}n be a sequence in R≥0 such
that tn ↓ t. Define the sets An := {x : Λ(x) ≤ tn} and note that P(Λ(X0) ≤ tn) = P(X0 ∈ An). Clearly,
if x ∈ {x : Λ(x) ≤ t} then ∀n : Λ(x) ≤ t ≤ tn and thus x ∈ ∩nAn. If on the other hand x ∈ ∩nAn then
∀n : Λ(x) ≤ tn → t as n→∞. Hence, we have that ∩nAn = {x : Λ(x) ≤ t} and thus
lim
n→∞P (Λ(X0) ≤ tn) = P (Λ(X0) ≤ t) (22)
since limn→∞ P (X0 ∈ An) = P(X0 ∈ ∩nAn) for An+1 ⊆ An. We conclude that t 7→ P (Λ(X0) ≤ t) is
right-continuous and in particular P (Λ(X0) ≤ tp) ≥ p.
We now show the LHS of inequality (21). For that purpose, consider the sets Bn := {x : Λ(x) < tp − 1/n}
and let B := {x : Λ(x) < tp}. Clearly, if x ∈ ∪nBn, then ∃n such that Λ(x) < tp − 1/n < tp and hence
x ∈ B. If on the other hand x ∈ B, then we can choose n large enough such that Λ(x) < tp − 1/n and thus
x ∈ ∪nBn. It follows that B = ∪nBn. Furthermore, by the definition of tp and since for any n ∈ N we have
that P (X0 ∈ Bn) = P (Λ(X0) < tp − 1/n) < p it follows that
P (Λ(X0) < tp) = lim
n→∞P (X0 ∈ Bn) ≤ p (23)
since Bn ⊆ Bn+1. This concludes the proof.
Lemma A.2. Let X0 and X1 be random variables taking values in Z and with probability density functions f0
and f1 with respect to a measure µ. Let φ∗ be a likelihood ratio test for testing the null X0 against the alternative
X1. Then for any deterministic function φ : Z → [0, 1] the following implications hold:
(i) E(φ(X0)) ≥ 1− E(φ∗(X0))⇒ E(φ(X1)) ≥ 1− E(φ∗(X1))
(ii) E(φ(X0)) ≤ E(φ∗(X0))⇒ E(φ(X1)) ≤ E(φ∗(X1))
Proof. We first show (i). Let φ∗ be a likelihood ratio test as defined in (3). Recall that the likelihood ratio test
is given by
φ∗(x) =

1 if Λ(x) > t,
q if Λ(x) = t,
0 if Λ(x) < t,
with Λ(x) =
f1(x)
f0(x)
, (24)
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q ∈ [0, 1] and t ≥ 0. Then for any other test φ we have
E(φ(X1))− (1− E(φ∗(X1))) =
∫
φf1dµ−
(
1−
∫
Λ>t
f1dµ− q
∫
Λ=t
f1dµ
)
(25)
=
∫
Λ>t
φf1dµ+
∫
Λ≤t
(φ− 1) f1dµ+ q
∫
Λ=t
f1dµ (26)
=
∫
Λ>t
φΛf0dµ+
∫
Λ≤t
(φ− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
Λf0dµ+ q
∫
Λ=t
Λf0dµ (27)
≥ t ·
[∫
Λ>t
φf0dµ+
∫
Λ≤t
(φ− 1) f0dµ+ q
∫
Λ=t
f0dµ
]
(28)
= t ·
[∫
φf0dµ−
(
1−
∫
Λ>t
f0dµ− q
∫
Λ=t
f0dµ
)]
(29)
= t · [E(φ(X0))− (1− E(φ∗(X0)))] ≥ 0 (30)
with the last inequality following from the assumption and t ≥ 0. Thus, (i) follows; (ii) can be proved
analogously.
A.2 Main Proof
Proof. We first show the existence of a likelihood ratio test φA with significance level 1− pA by construction.
Let Z ′ := (δ,∆) + Z and recall that the likelihood ratio Λ between the densities of Z and Z ′ is given
by Λ(z) = fZ′ (z)fZ(z) and let X
′ := δ + X and W ′ = ∆ + (W, V ). Furthermore, for any p ∈ [0, 1], let
tp := inf{t ≥ 0: P(Λ(Z) ≤ t) ≥ p} and
qp =
{
0 if P (Λ(Z) = tp) = 0,
P(Λ(Z)≤tp)−p
P(Λ(Z)=tp) otherwise.
(31)
Note that by Lemma A.1 we have that P(Λ(Z) ≤ tp) ≥ p and
P(Λ(Z) ≤ tp) = P(Λ(Z) < tp) + P(Λ(Z) = tp) ≤ p+ P(Λ(Z) = tp) (32)
and hence qp ∈ [0, 1]. For p ∈ [0, 1], let φp be the likelihood ratio test given by
φp(z) =

1 if Λ(z) > tp
qp if Λ(z) = tp
0 if Λ(z) < tp
(33)
and note that it has significance level 1− p since
α(φp) = P (Λ(Z) > tp) + qp · P (Λ(Z) = tp) (34)
= 1− P(Λ(Z) ≤ tp) + P(Λ(Z) ≤ tp)− p (35)
= 1− p. (36)
Thus, the test φA ≡ φpA corresponding to pA has significance level 1−pA and it follows from the assumption (7)
that
E(ykA(x+X, D +W )) = gZkA(x, D) ≥ pA = 1− α(φA) = 1− E(φA(Z)) (37)
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and thus, by applying the first part of Lemma A.2 to the functions φ ≡ ykA and φ∗ ≡ φA it follows that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆) = E(ykA(x+X
′, D +W ′)) = E(φ(Z ′)) ≥ 1− E(φA(Z ′)) = 1− β(φA). (38)
Similarly, the test φB ≡ φ1−pB corresponding to 1 − pB has significance level pB and it follows from the
assumption (7) that for any k 6= kA
E(yk(x+X, D +W )) = gZk (x, D) ≤ pB = α(φB) = E(φB(Z)). (39)
Thus, applying the second part of Lemma A.2 to the functions φ ≡ yk and φ∗ ≡ φB yields
gZk (x+ δ, D + ∆) = E(yk(x+X ′, D +W ′)) ≤ E(φB(Z ′)) = β(φB). (40)
Combining (38) and (40) we see that if β(φB) < 1− β(φA), then it is guaranteed that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆) > maxk 6=kA
gZk (x+ δ, D + ∆) (41)
what completes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We show tightness by constructing a score function y, which is consistent with the class probabilities (7)
for a given (fixed) input (x0, D0) but whose smoothed version is not robust if the adversarial perturbations
(δ, ∆) violate (8). Recall that Z = (X, W, V ). Suppose that φA and φB are two likelihood ratio tests for
testing the null Z against the alternative Z ′ := (δ, ∆)+Z and with significance levels given by α(φA) = 1−pA
and α(φB) = pB and suppose that
β(φB) > 1− β(φA). (42)
Let y be the scoring function given by
yk(x, D) =

1− φA(x− x0, D −D0) k = kA
φB(x− x0, D −D0) k = kB
1−ykA (x,D)−ykB (x,D)
C−2 o.w.
(43)
From the definition it follows immediately that
∑
k yk(x,D) = 1. To see that yk ≥ 0, it follows from the
construction of φA and φB in the proof of Theorem 1 that (pointwise) φA ≥ φB provided that pA + pB ≤ 1.
It follows that yk ∝ 1 − ykA − ykB = φA − φB ≥ 0 and thus y is indeed a well-defined score function.
Furthermore, the corresponding smoothed classifier gZ is consistent with the class probabilities (7) since
gZkA(x0, D0) = E(ykA(x0 +X, D0 +W )) = E(1− φA(X, W )) = 1− α(φA) = pA (44)
and
gZkB (x0, D0) = E(ykB (x0 +X, D0 +W )) = E(φB(X, W )) = α(φB) = pB . (45)
In addition, since
gZkA(x0 + δ, D0 + ∆) = 1− E(φA(δ +X, ∆ + (W, V ))) (46)
= 1− β(φA) (47)
< β(φB) = E(φB(δ +X, ∆ + (W, V ))) (48)
= gZkB (x0 + δ, D0 + ∆) (49)
it follows that gZ is not robust at (x0, D0).
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C Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2
Proof of Corollary 1. We prove this statement by direct application of Theorem 1. For that purpose, let
Z˜ := (δ, ∆x + ∆y) + Z and
Z˜ := (δ, ∆x + ∆y) + Z, Z˜
′ := (0, −∆x) + Z˜. (50)
Since by assumption
gZ˜kA(x, D) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ maxk 6=kA g
Z˜
k (x, D), (51)
Theorem 1 tells us that there exist tests φA and φB for testing Z˜ against Z˜ ′ such that, if their powers satisfy
β(φB) < 1− β(φA) (52)
then it follows that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆y) = g
Z˜′
kA(x, D −∆x) > maxk 6=kA g
Z˜′
k (x, D −∆x) = max
k 6=kA
gZk (x+ δ, D + ∆y). (53)
We will now construct the corresponding tests and show that (52) has the form (12). Note since the likelihood
ratio between Z˜ against Z˜ ′ at z = (x, w, v) is given by
Λ(z) = exp
(
n∑
i=1
〈wi, −δi〉Σ + 1
2
〈δi, δi〉Σ
)
(54)
where Σ = σ21d and 〈a, b〉Σ :=
∑n
i=1 aibi/σ
2. Thus, since singletons have probability 0 under the Gaussian
distribution, any likelihood ratio test for testing Z˜ against Z˜ ′ has the form
φt(z) =
{
1, Λ(z) ≥ t.
0, Λ(z) < t.
(55)
For p ∈ [0, 1], let
tp := exp
Φ−1(p)
√√√√ n∑
i=1
〈δi, δi〉Σ − 1
2
n∑
i=1
〈δi, δi〉Σ
 (56)
and note that the test φtp has significance 1− p, since
α(φtp) = P
(
Λ(Z˜) ≥ tp
)
= 1− Φ
(
log(tp) +
1
2
∑n
i=1〈δi, δi〉Σ√∑n
i=1〈δi, δi〉Σ
)
= 1− p (57)
where Φ is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Thus, the test φA ≡ φtA with tA ≡ tpA has significance
1− pA and the test φB ≡ φtB with tB ≡ t1−pB has significance pB . Computing the power of φA yields
β(φA) = P
(
Λ(Z˜ ′) ≥ tA
)
= 1− Φ
(
log(tA)− 12
∑n
i=1〈δi, δi〉Σ√∑n
i=1〈δi, δi〉Σ
)
(58)
= 1− Φ
Φ−1(pA)−
√√√√ n∑
i=1
〈δi, δi〉Σ
 (59)
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and similarly, the power of φB is given by
β(φB) = 1− Φ
Φ−1(1− pB)−
√√√√ n∑
i=1
〈δi, δi〉Σ
 . (60)
Finally, we see that β(φB) < 1− β(φA) is satisfied iff√√√√ n∑
i=1
‖δi‖22 <
σ
2
(
Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)
)
(61)
what concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. We prove this statement by direct application of Theorem 1. For that purpose, let
Z˜ := (δ, ∆x + ∆y) + Z and
Z˜ := (δ, ∆x + ∆y) + Z, Z˜
′ := (0, −∆x) + Z˜. (62)
Since by assumption
gZ˜kA(x, D) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ maxk 6=kA g
Z˜
k (x, D), (63)
Theorem 1 tells us that there exist tests φA and φB for testing Z˜ against Z˜ ′ such that, if their powers satisfy
β(φB) < 1− β(φA) (64)
then it follows that
gZkA(x+ δ, D + ∆y) = g
Z˜′
kA(x, D −∆x) > maxk 6=kA g
Z˜′
k (x, D −∆x) = max
k 6=kA
gZk (x+ δ, D + ∆y). (65)
We will now construct the corresponding tests and show that (64) has the form (16). Denote by S :=∏n
i=1 Si, Si :=
∏d
j=1[a + δij , b + δij ] the support of W˜ := ∆x + W and by S
′ :=
∏n
i=1[a, b]
d the support of
W˜ ′ := W . Note the likelihood ratio between Z˜ against Z˜ ′ at z = (x, w, v) for any w ∈ S ∪ S′ is given by
Λ(z) =
fZ˜′(z)
fZ˜(z)
=
fW˜ ′(w)
fW˜ (w)
=

0 w ∈ S \ S′,
1 w ∈ S ∩ S′,
∞ w ∈ S′ \ S.
(66)
and that any likelihood ratio test for testing Z˜ against Z˜ ′ has the form
φt(z) =

1, Λ(z) > t
q, Λ(z) = t
0, Λ(z) < t.
(67)
We now construct likelihood ratio tests with significance levels 1− pA and pB by following the construction in
the proof of Theorem 1. Specifically, we compute qA, tA such that the associated likelihood ratio test φA has
significance 1− pA and qB and tB such that φB has significance pB . Notice that
p0 := P
(
W˜ ∈ S \ S′
)
= 1−
n∏
i=1
 d∏
j=1
(
1− |δij |
b− a
)
+
 (68)
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where (x)+ = max{x, 0}. For t ≥ 0 we have
P
(
Λ(Z˜) ≤ t
)
=
{
p0 t < 1
1 t ≥ 1 (69)
and thus
tp := inf{t ≥ 0: P(Λ(Z) ≤ t) ≥ p} =
{
0, p ≤ p0
1, p > p0.
(70)
We notice that, if pA ≤ p0, then tA ≡ tpA = 0. This implies that the power of the corresponding test φA is 1
since in this case
β(φA) = P
(
Λ(Z˜ ′) > 0
)
+ qA · P
(
Λ(Z˜ ′) = 0
)
(71)
= P
(
W˜ ′ ∈ S′
)
+ qA · P
(
W˜ ′ ∈ S \ S′
)
= 1. (72)
Similarly, if 1− pB ≤ p0 then tB ≡ tpB = 0 and we obtain that the corresponding test φB has power 1. In both
cases β(φB) < 1− β(φA) = 0 can never be satisfied and we find that pA > p0 and 1− pB > p0 is a necessary
condition. In this case, we have that tA = tB = 1. Let qA and qB be defined as in the proof of Theorem 1
qA :=
P(Λ(Z˜) ≤ 1)− pA
P(Λ(Z˜) = 1)
=
1− pA
1− p0 , (73)
qB :=
P(Λ(Z˜) ≤ 1)− (1− pB)
P(Λ(Z˜) = 1)
=
1− (1− pB)
1− p0 . (74)
Clearly, the corresponding likelihood ratio tests φA and φB have significance 1 − pA and pB respectively.
Furthermore, notice that
P
(
W˜ ′ ∈ S′ \ S
)
= P
(
W˜ ∈ S \ S′
)
= p0 (75)
P
(
W˜ ′ ∈ S′ ∩ S
)
= P
(
W˜ ∈ S′ ∩ S
)
= 1− p0 (76)
and hence the power of the test φA is given by
β(φA) = P
(
Λ(Z˜ ′) > 1
)
+ qA · P
(
Λ(Z˜ ′) = 1
)
(77)
= P
(
W˜ ′ ∈ S′ \ S
)
+ qA · P
(
W˜ ′ ∈ S′ ∩ S
)
(78)
= p0 + qA · (1− p0) = p0 + 1− pA (79)
and similarly
β(φB) = P
(
Λ(Z˜ ′) > 1
)
+ qB · P
(
Λ(Z˜ ′) = 1
)
(80)
= P
(
W˜ ′ ∈ S′ \ S
)
+ qB · P
(
W˜ ′ ∈ S′ ∩ S
)
(81)
= p0 + qB · (1− p0) = p0 + 1− (1− pB). (82)
Finally, algebra yields that β(φB) < 1− β(φA) iff
1−
(
pA − pB
2
)
<
n∏
i=1
 d∏
j=1
(
1− |δij |
b− a
)
+
 (83)
concluding the proof.
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D Smoothed K-NN Classifiers
We first formalize K-NN classifiers which use quantizeed euclidean distance as a notion of similarity. Specif-
ically, let B1 = [0, b1), . . . , BL := [bL−1,∞) be similarity buckets with increasing b1 < b2 < . . . , bL−1
and associated similarity levels β1 > β2 > . . . > βL. Then for x, x′ ∈ Rd we define their similarity as
κ(x, x′) :=
∑L
l=1 βl1Bl(‖x− x′‖22) where 1Bl is the indicator function of Bl. Given a dataset D = (xi, yi)ni=1
and a test instance x, we define the relation
xi  xj ⇐⇒
{
κ(xi, x) > κ(xj , x) if i > j
κ(xi, x) ≥ κ(xj , x) if i ≤ j
(84)
which says that the instance xi is more similar to x, if either it has strictly larger similarity or, if it has the
same similarity as xj , then xi is more similar if i < j. With this binary relation, we define the set of K nearest
neighbours of x as
IK(x, D) := {i : |{j 6= i : xj  xi}| ≤ K − 1} ⊆ [n] (85)
and summarize the per class votes in IK as a label tally vector
γk(x, D) := #{i ∈ IK(x, D) : yi = k}. (86)
The prediction of a K-NN classifier is then given by
K-NN(x, D) = arg max
k
γk(x, D). (87)
D.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Our goal is to show that we can compute the smoothed classifier gZ with Z = (0, (W, 0)), W ∼∏n
i=1N (0, σ21d) and defined by the probability
gZk (x, D) = P (K-NN(x, D +W ) = k) (88)
in time O(K2+C · n2 · L · C).4 For ease of notation, let Xi := xi +Wi and Si := κ(Xi, x) and note that
pli := P (Si = βl) = Fd,λi
(
bl
σ2
)
− Fd,λi
(
bl−1
σ2
)
(89)
where Fd,λi is the CDF of the non-central χ
2-distribution with d degrees of freedom and non-locality parameter
λi = ‖xi + δi − x‖22 /σ2. Note that we can write (88) equivalently as P (arg maxk′ γk′(x, D + (W, 0)) = k)
and thus
gZk (x, D) =
∑
γ∈Γk
P (γ(x, D +W ) = γ) (90)
with Γk := {γ ∈ [K]C : arg maxk′ γk′ = k}. Next, we notice that the event that a tally vector γ occurs, can be
partitioned into the events that lead to the given γ and for which instance i has similarity βl and is in the
top-K but not in the top-(K − 1). We define these to be the boundary events
Bli(γ) := {∀c : #{j ∈ Ic : Xj  Xi} = γc, Si = βl} (91)
where Ic = {i : yi = c}. The probability that a given tally vector γ occurs is thus given by
P (γ(x, D +W ) = γ) =
n∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
P
(Bli(γ)) . (92)
4We write D +W for D + (W, 0) to reduce clutter.
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For fixed i we notice that the for different classes, the events {#{j ∈ Ic : Xj  Xi} = γc} are pairwise indepen-
dent, conditioned on {Si = βl}. Writing P lc(i, γ) for the conditional probability P (#{i ∈ Ic : yi = c} = γc|Si = βl)
yields
P
(Bli(γ)) = pli · C∏
c=1
P lc(i, γ) (93)
and hence
gZk (x, D) =
∑
γ∈Γk
n∑
i=1
L∑
l=1
pli ·
C∏
c=1
P lc(i, γ) (94)
which requires O(KC · n · L · C) evaluations of P lc . The next is to compute the probabilities P lc . For that
purpose we need to open up the binary relation . Suppose first, that yi 6= c. Then the event that exactly
γc instances of class c satisfy Xj  Xi is the same as the event that for some r ≤ γc exactly r instances with
index larger than i have similarity strictly larger than Xi and exactly γc − r instances with index smaller than
i have similarity larger or equal than Xi. Now suppose that yi = c. Then, the event that exactly γc instances
of the same class c satisfy Xj  Xi is the same as the event that for some r ≤ γc exactly r instances with
index larger than i have similarity strictly larger than Xi and exactly γc − r − 1 instances with index smaller
than i have similarity larger or equal than Xi. This reasoning allows us to write P lc in terms of functions
Rlc(i, r) := P (|{j ∈ Ic : Sj > βl, j > i}| = r) (95)
Qlc(i, r) := P (|{j ∈ Ic : Sj ≥ βl, j < i}| = r) (96)
as
P lc(i, γ) =
{∑γc
r=0R
l
c(i, r) ·Qlc(i, γc − r) yi 6= c∑γc−1
r=0 R
l
c(i, r) ·Qlc(i, γc − r − 1) yi = c.
(97)
The functions Rcl and Q
c
l exhibit recursive structure that we wish to exploit in order to get an efficient
algorithm. Specifically, we write αli := P(Si ≤ βl) =
∑L
s=l p
l
i, and α¯
l
i := 1−αli and use the following recursion
Rcl (i− 1, r) =
{
Rlc(i, r) yi 6= c
α¯li ·Rlc(i, r − 1) + αli ·Rlc(i, r) yi = c
(98)
starting at i = n and r = 0 and with initial values Rlc(i, −1) = 0, Rcl (n, 0) = 1 and Rcl (n, r) = 0 for r ≥ 1.
Similarly,
Qlc(i+ 1, r) =
{
Qlc(i, r) yi 6= c
α¯l+1i ·Qlc(i, r − 1) + αl+1i ·Qlc(i, r) yi = c
(99)
starting the recursion at i = 1 and r = 0 and with initial values Qlc(i, −1) = 0, Qlc(1, 0) = 1 and Qlc(1, r) = 0
for r ≥ 1. Evaluating P lc requires O(K) calls to Rlc and Qlc each. The computation of Rlc and Qlc can be
achieved in O(n ·K) if the values αli are computed beforehand and stored separately (requiring O(n · L)
computations). Finally, the entire computation has a time complexity of O(KC+2 · n2 ·L ·C) which concludes
the proof.
Algorithms. Here, we show recursive algorithms for computing the function Qlc and R
l
c in Algorithms 2 and 3.
An efficient implementation for evaluating the smoothed K-NN classifier exactly, will first compute both Rlc
and Qlc and then, given those values, compute the sum in (94). This is shown in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 2 COMPUTEQlc
Input: integers i, r, probabilities {psj}j,s
Output: COMPUTEQlc(i, r)
/* stopping points */
1: if r = −1 then
2: return 0
3: end if
4: if i = 0 then
5: if r = 0 then
6: return 1
7: else
8: return 0
9: end if
10: end if
/* recursion */
11: if yi−1 = c then
12: q ← (∑ls=1 psi−1) · COMPUTEQlc(i− 1, r − 1)
13: q ← q + (∑Ls=l+1 psi−1) · COMPUTEQlc(i− 1, r)
14: return q
15: else
16: return COMPUTEQlc(i− 1, r)
17: end if
Algorithm 3 COMPUTERlc
Input: integers i, r, probabilities {psj}j,s
Output: COMPUTERlc(i, r)
/* stopping points */
1: if r = −1 then
2: return 0
3: end if
4: if i = n+ 1 then
5: if r=0 then
6: return 1
7: else
8: return 0
9: end if
10: end if
/* recursion */
11: if yi+1 = c then
12: p← (∑l−1s=1 psi+1) · COMPUTERlc(i+ 1, r − 1)
13: p← p+ (∑Ls=l psi+1) · COMPUTERlc(i+ 1, r)
14: return p
15: else
16: return COMPUTERlc(i+ 1, r)
17: end if
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Algorithm 4 KNNPREDICT
Input: probabilities {prj}j,r, dataset D, class k
Output: probability of class k predicted by smoothed K-NN classifier (20)
/* Compute P lc and Q
l
c*/
1: for c = 1, . . . , C do
2: for l = 1, . . . , L do
3: Rlc ← COMPUTERlc(i, k) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ k ≤ K
4: Qlc ← COMPUTEQlc(i, k) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ k ≤ K
5: end for
6: end for
/* Compute the smoothed K-NN classifier gZ*/
7: final pred← 0
8: for i = 1, . . . , n do
9: for l = 1, . . . , L do
10: for γ ∈ ΓK,k do
11: tp← pli
12: for c = 1, . . . , C do
13: if c = yi then
14: tp← tp ·∑γc−1r=0 Rlc(i, r) ·Qlc(i, γc − 1− r)
15: else
16: tp← tp ·∑γcr=0Rlc(i, r) ·Qlc(i, γc − r)
17: end if
18: end for
19: final pred← final pred + tp
20: end for
21: end for
22: end for
23: return final prediction
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